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The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) focused
on protecting competition in developing online markets. Our review discusses important
economic issues that are raised by the FCC’s Open Internet rulemaking (FCC, 2010), which is
commonly referred to as “net neutrality,” and its review of Comcast’s programming joint venture
with General Electric’s NBC Universal affiliate (Comcast/NBCU) (FCC, 2011). The Open
Internet rule was concerned with established online markets, while the Comcast/NBCU
transaction addressed nascent competition online along with competition in video programming
and distribution offline.

Open Internet Rulemaking
In 2010, the FCC adopted three broad rules that are designed to preserve aspects of the
Internet that have made it an important engine of social improvement and economic growth: 1)
The “transparency” rule requires all broadband providers to disclose the network management
practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of their services. 2) The “no
blocking” rule prohibits fixed broadband providers from blocking end user access to lawful
content, applications, services, and non-harmful devices. Mobile broadband providers are
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subject to a similar but more limited prohibition against blocking websites or blocking
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services. 3) The “no unreasonable
discrimination” rule prevents fixed broadband providers from unreasonable discrimination in
transmitting network traffic.
The Commission further explained that differential treatment of network traffic by
broadband providers is more likely to be reasonable the more transparent it is, the more it results
from end user choice, the less it discriminates by use or classes of uses, and the more closely it
conforms with the best practices and technical standards that have been adopted by open,
representative and independent organizations (FCC, 2010 ¶¶68-74).
The prohibition against unreasonable discrimination does not bar reasonable network
management to address network congestion or service quality issues (FCC, 2010 ¶82), as may
arise, for example, at usage peaks or if heavy users threaten to crowd out others (FCC, 2010
¶91). It also allows fixed broadband providers to prevent the transfer of harmful or unlawful
content. “Pay for priority” agreements – commercial arrangements between a broadband
provider and a third party such as a content or applications provider to favor some traffic over
other traffic in the broadband connection to a subscriber of the broadband provider – are unlikely
to satisfy the “no unreasonable discrimination” standard (FCC, 2010 ¶76). This skepticism does
not apply to arrangements by which broadband providers charge end users for priority service;
these would generally be permitted if fully disclosed and not harmful to competition or end users
(FCC, 2010 ¶71).
The FCC’s order provides an analysis that distinguishes the provision of content,
applications, services, and devices that are accessed over the Internet – termed “edge” products
and services – from the provision of broadband Internet access. Some firms provide both
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Internet access and edge services, as with a broadband provider that offers online video content,
and some end users may also generate and share content such as personal blogs or Facebook
pages. But the three types of actors – broadband providers, edge providers, and end users – are
conceptually distinct and often in practice are different entities.
An important goal of the FCC’s Open Internet rules is to protect competition among edge
providers, for the benefit of end users, against problems that are created by the ability and
incentive of broadband providers to limit Internet openness. In particular, a broadband provider
has the ability to favor one edge provider over another, whether by limiting edge provider access
to broadband subscribers or charging disfavored edge providers more for that access. A
broadband provider may have an anticompetitive incentive to exercise that ability on behalf of
affiliated edge offerings or on behalf of unaffiliated edge providers who pay it to exclude their
rivals, as described in the familiar antitrust literature on exclusionary conduct and “raising rivals’
costs” (FCC, 2010 ¶¶21, 23).
In addition, a broadband provider that can charge edge providers for prioritized access to
end users would have an incentive to degrade or decline to increase the quality of the service that
it provides to non-prioritized traffic. The broadband provider could increase the gap in quality
between prioritized and non-prioritized access by declining to expand capacity, thereby
increasing the likelihood of congestion. A reduction in service quality could induce more edge
users to pay for prioritized access and allow the broadband provider to charge higher prices for
prioritized access (FCC, 2010 ¶29). This outcome could be understood as a form of price
discrimination, which can, but need not invariably, harm competition. Conduct that degrades the
quality of service or increases congestion could also be objectionable on communications policy
grounds that are independent of competitive concerns.
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Finally, broadband providers have the ability and incentive to charge edge providers
inefficiently high fees for prioritized access to end users because they act as gatekeepers or socalled “terminating monopolists” (FCC, 2010 ¶¶24-26). That is, a broadband provider creates a
two-sided platform on which it is typically an edge provider’s only option for reaching a
particular end user. If the end user selects content, applications, or services on the Internet, it
almost invariably chooses the broadband provider that the edge provider must rely upon to reach
the end user. A broadband provider can act as a gatekeeper even if some edge providers would
have bargaining power in negotiations with broadband providers over access or prioritization
fees. The broadband provider’s ability to act as gatekeeper with respect to edge providers is
independent of the possibility that it may exercise market power with respect to end users.
A broadband provider, exploiting its position as gatekeeper, would be expected to set
inefficiently high fees to edge providers because of a negative externality: No broadband
provider accounts for more than a minority of subscribers, so no provider will fully account for
the detrimental impact on edge provider investment and innovation, including the possibility that
some edge providers might exit or decline to enter the market. Moreover, fees for access or
prioritized access, however inefficiently high to begin with, could rise even more by triggering
an “arms race” within an edge market segment: If one edge provider pays for access or
prioritized access, subscribers may favor its services, and competing edge providers may respond
by paying as well.
The FCC’s order emphasizes one of the many mechanisms by which conduct that harms
competition can injure consumers: the threat of a reduction in the rate of innovation among edge
providers and broadband providers. This focus recognizes the role of the Internet as a “general
purpose technology” that enables new methods of production throughout the economy, and the
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way that an open Internet has stimulated a virtuous circle of innovation in which new uses of the
network created by edge providers lead to increased end-user demand for broadband, stimulating
network improvements and leading in turn to the further development of network uses (FCC,
2010 ¶¶13-14). Conduct that blocks or degrades the access of disfavored edge providers to end
users directly threatens the operation of this virtuous circle. Higher prices to edge providers,
whether specifically disfavored or across-the-board, pose an indirect threat because they reduce
the potential profit that an edge provider would expect to earn from developing new offerings,
and thereby reduce edge provider incentives to invest and innovate. These costs will likely have
a particularly great chilling effect on emerging “garage entrepreneurs” by raising their
transaction costs and creating impediments to financing (FCC, 2010 ¶26).
The academic literature on net neutrality does not emphasize threats to the virtuous circle
of innovation. It instead focuses on the direct effects on prices and investment of a prohibition
against “pay for priority” arrangements between edge providers and broadband providers, in a
framework in which broadband providers are viewed as two-sided platforms and both sides
(edge providers and end users) benefit from network effects (Rochet and Tirole, 2003;
Armstrong, 2006; Musacchio et al., 2009; Weyl, 2010; Economides and Hermalin, 2010).

In

these models, a rule that imposes a binding constraint on pricing on one side of the platform
likely alters pricing on the other side, but the net effect on investment and welfare is typically
ambiguous (FCC, 2010 ¶28 n.80).
The difficulty of identifying the effect of a pricing rule in a two-sided platform setting is
evident in the simplest case, in which a monopolist controls both sides of the platform.1 Denote

1

Many end-users can choose among multiple providers of broadband access services. Once an end-user requests
content using the access that is offered by a particular broadband provider, however, that broadband provider
becomes the sole provider of access to that customer with respect to the requested content. In part for this reason,
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output on the two sides as X and Y, with prices p and q, respectively. Because of (positive)
network effects, a platform monopolist faces demand functions X(p,Y) and Y(q,X), with the
partial derivatives XY and YX both positive. On the assumption that appropriate regularity
conditions hold, these demand functions can be written X(p,q) and Y(q,p), with partial derivatives
Xq and Yp (and thus the corresponding cross-price elasticities of demand) both negative, as is also
the case for demand complements. Accordingly, the firm’s optimization problem is analogous to
the familiar pricing problem that faces a multiproduct monopolist selling demand complements
(Tirole, 1988, p. 70).2 A multiproduct monopolist selling demand complements has an incentive
to reduce the prices of its products below what it would charge if demands were independent. If
the complementarities are sufficiently great, it could set a price for one product below marginal
cost in order to raise demand for other products. Similarly, a monopolist of a two-sided
platform subject to network effects may set the price on either side below cost, in order to attract
the participation of buyers on the other side, though it could also charge prices above cost on
both sides.
Under such circumstances, a rule imposing a price on one side of the platform (for
example, a price of zero), could lead the monopolist to alter the price it charges on the other side,
either raising or lowering it. The direction of the price change depends on whether the rule raises
or lowers price on the first side, and on the way the resulting shifts in demand and the magnitude
of network effects alter the demand elasticities on the other side. If the pricing constraint binds,
the platform monopolist’s profits necessarily decline, but both aggregate surplus and consumer
surplus may either increase or decrease.
neither an end user’s ability to switch broadband providers nor competition among broadband providers for
subscribers would prevent discrimination against edge providers (FCC, 2010 ¶¶27, 32 n.87).
2
The key difference between the two settings is on the buyer side: Buyers of demand complements internalize the
benefits of purchasing one product for their purchases of the other, while the network effects at issue here are not
internalized by buyers.
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Broadband providers today do not in general base investment decisions on the prospect of
charging freely on both sides of the market (FCC, 2010 ¶39). If they were to do so, however, the
two-sided platform models suggest that the introduction of a rule that imposes a price on one side
of the platform might lead a broadband provider to invest less. Yet aggregate industry
investment does not depend solely on the investment decisions of broadband providers; it also
depends on the incentives of edge providers (and in some cases also end users) to invest, which
may be enhanced by the same pricing rule. Even putting aside feedbacks between the investment
decisions of broadband providers and edge providers, therefore, the net consequences of a
pricing rule for industry investment are unclear within the contours of current two-sided platform
models, and the welfare effects of such a rule are ambiguous as a matter of theory. Moreover,
these models do not capture the virtuous circle that is central to industry-wide innovation and
investment in broadband and thus do not address the range of consequences of a pricing rule with
which the FCC is concerned.
In particular, a number of economic forces that potentially lead to inefficiently low edge
investments in developing new products are recognized by the FCC in its Open Internet order:
contracting problems (Greenstein, 2009), including excessive transactions costs, opportunism,
holdups, and double marginalization; excessive fees charged by the network provider arising
from the negative externality discussed above (Armstrong, 2006; Lee and Wu, 2009); the
reduction in broadband competition that may arise if a broadband provider contracts with an
edge provider to deny a rival broadband provider access to the edge provider (Armstrong, 2006,
pp. 24-26); and the reduction in edge provider competition that may arise if a broadband provider
contracts with an edge provider to deny a rival edge provider access to the broadband provider’s
end users. The importance of these economic forces and the Internet’s openness is suggested by
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the many examples in telecommunications history in which a modular industry structure,
supported by an open architecture, has fostered innovation in individual components, spurred
market entry, and resulted in lower prices (Farrell and Weiser, 2003).
Any slowdown in the rate of broadband industry innovation that arises from widespread
interference with the Internet’s openness would likely cause harms that would be costly or
impossible to undo. Broadband providers and edge providers alike may make sunk investments
in reliance on exclusive preferential arrangements between the two and on the opportunities for
developing new businesses that are missed if broadband provider practices chill edge provider
entry, and innovation may never return. The resulting losses in innovation, investment, and
competition may be impossible to restore after the fact (FCC, 2010 ¶38). Accordingly, the FCC
concluded that the benefits of a rule that prevents interference with openness are large, and many
of those benefits would be lost by waiting until problems were observed before taking action
(FCC, 2010 ¶41). By contrast, the FCC concluded that the costs that are imposed by its order
would be small, because the rules are largely consistent with current and planned business
practices and because they would not prohibit reasonable network management (FCC, 2010 ¶39).

Comcast/NBCU
Early in 2011, the FCC permitted the Comcast/NBCU programming joint venture to
proceed, subject to a range of conditions (FCC, 2011).3 The proposed joint venture gave
Comcast control of NBCU’s programming assets, including the NBC broadcast network, the
Universal Studios film library, and cable networks such as MSNBC, CNBC, Bravo, and USA
Network. Comcast brought to the joint venture its interests in cable networks, including regional

3

The FCC’s review of the transaction was closely coordinated with the Department of Justice (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2011).
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sports networks, the Golf Channel, and Versus, so the transaction had a horizontal element. But
the transaction was primarily vertical in nature: NBCU was a major content provider, which
operated upstream of Comcast, which is a leading multichannel video programming distributor
(MVPD) and a leading broadband Internet access provider.
Today, Comcast’s primary video distribution competition comes from rival MVPDs, such
as direct broadcast satellite providers (Dish and DIRECTV) and telephone company providers in
its service areas. In the future, these firms may also face competition from online video
distributors (OVDs) that are not MVPDs, perhaps including Hulu, Netflix, GoogleTV, and
iTunes. The Commission viewed OVDs as primarily potential rivals. It concluded that Comcast
would have the ability and incentive to hinder the development of competition from them after a
transaction that conferred upon it control of NBCU programming (FCC, 2011 ¶86), and adopted
various conditions to ensure that OVDs would retain non-discriminatory access to programming
that was controlled by the joint venture. Most importantly, once an OVD has entered into an
arrangement to distribute programming from one or more of the joint venture’s peers, the joint
venture must make any of its comparable programming available on economically comparable
terms, which will be enforced by baseball-style arbitration (in which the arbitrator picks between
the final offers submitted by the parties). The Commission explained that this approach “will
ensure access to programming by OVDs as the online services develop, without prejudging the
direction that dynamic market will take” (FCC, 2011 ¶88).
Although the bulk of the Commission’s competition-related conditions4 addressed
nascent competition online, the absence of data with respect to immature markets meant that
Commission’s quantitative studies were limited to examining aspects of the distribution of video
4

The Commission’s public interest mandate extends beyond the goal of fostering or protecting competition. Other
conditions in the order protected localism and diversity in programming, journalistic independence, children’s
programming, and broadband deployment and adoption.
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programming through traditional MVPDs. The Commission relied upon five economic
analyses, all of which supported its conclusion that the transaction would harm competition in
traditional programming distribution and its inference that the transaction would also harm
potential competition through online distribution unless conditions were imposed to address the
problems that the Commission identified.5

A.

Foreclosure of MVPD Rivals by Withholding Programming

The FCC’s first analysis assessed the post-transaction profitability of exclusionary
strategies that would involve the temporary or permanent withholding of joint venture
programming from rival MVPDs. The modeling evaluated one particular scenario that was
emphasized in the Commission’s record: the potential for prohibiting a rival MVPD from
distributing an NBC television broadcast station that was owned by the joint venture (FCC, 2011
¶2). The Commission assessed the profitability of this scenario through financial modeling of
benefits and costs (FCC, 2011 App B. ¶¶2-35). This foreclosure profitability “arithmetic”
assumed that successful foreclosure of an MVPD rival would not lead Comcast to increase the
subscription price to consumers or the retransmission consent fee that the station would receive
from other MVPDs. This assumption is conservative (understates the profitability of
foreclosure) if Comcast would profit more from a lesser increase in the price of programming
than from charging above what the MVPD would be willing to pay, as a withholding strategy in
effect requires.
The financial costs of this strategy to Comcast involve lost advertising fees and
retransmission consent fees from those customers of the rival MVPD who do not switch to
5

Baker (2011) provides a legally-oriented discussion of the FCC’s decision and the FCC’s economic evidence, and
Riordan (2008) surveys the economic issues that are at stake in assessing the competitive effects of vertical
integration generally.
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Comcast’s video distribution service in order to obtain access to the withheld programming. In
the Commission’s financial model, the per subscriber net advertising revenues and
retransmission fees are denoted Ad and Fee, respectively. The fraction of the rival MVPD’s
subscribers that switch to an alternative MVPD that carries the broadcast signal is denoted by d
and termed the “departure rate.” The fraction a of the rival’s subscribers remain with the rival
MVPD and obtain the broadcast signal over the air. Subs represents the absolute number of
subscribers to the rival’s video distribution service. Given these definitions, when Comcast
withholds a broadcast signal, it loses (1−d)×Subs×Fee in retransmission consent revenues and
(1−d−a)×Subs×Ad in advertising revenues, for a total cost given by:
Costs = (1−d)×Subs×Fee + (1−d−a)×Subs×Ad.
The financial benefits to Comcast from withholding a broadcast signal arise to the extent
that customers of the rival MVPD switch to become subscribers to Comcast’s video distribution
service in order to obtain access to the withheld programming. Comcast receives additional
profits from serving these new customers, with the level of profits per subscriber depending on
whether these incremental customers purchase its video distribution service only or whether they
also subscribe to Comcast’s broadband or telephony services. The average profit per new
subscriber is denoted π. Among the d x Subs customers who leave the rival that is subject to
withholding, the fraction α (termed the “diversion rate”) switch to Comcast. The
Comcast/NBCU joint venture thus gains (α x d x Subs) x π from the joint venture, with the
fraction s of those incremental profits accruing to Comcast (with the remainder going to General
Electric, Comcast’s joint venture partner). In sum, the benefits of withholding to Comcast are
given by:
Benefits = s x (α x d x Subs) x π.
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A permanent foreclosure strategy would be profitable to Comcast in this framework if the
strategy’s benefits to the firm exceed the costs. To determine whether this was the case, the
Commission calculated a threshold departure rate for which the benefits of permanently
withholding programming from an MVPD equal the costs. That “critical value,” denoted d*, is
found by equating the benefits and costs, and solving for d. It is given by:
d* = [(1-a) x Ad + Fee]/[s x α x π + Ad + Fee].
If the expected departure rate exceeds d*, then a permanent foreclosure strategy would be
profitable for Comcast.6
The Commission applied this model by estimating the critical threshold departure rate d*
from information about its parameters, and comparing that value with an estimate of the actual
departure rate for a number of geographic regions. Most of the parameters used in estimating d*
were taken from party documents or proposed by Comcast’s economists and accepted by the
Commission. The Commission estimated the diversion rate α from survey evidence that was
submitted by an MVPD that was concerned about the transaction and from internal Comcast
studies (FCC, 2011 App. B ¶¶15-16).
To estimate the actual departure rate, the Commission relied on a “difference-indifferences” econometric study of the consequences of a retransmission dispute.

During that

dispute DISH, a direct broadcast satellite distribution system, was unable to carry a broadcast
programming network in multiple cities, primarily in the Pacific Northwest. (FCC, 2011 App. B
¶¶30-34). The analysis compared subscriber growth in these “treatment group” cities with
trends in a set of “control group” cities in which DISH continuously carried all four major
broadcast networks.

Comparing the critical value of d* in various regions with the actual value

6

The corresponding critical value for analyzing the profitability of temporary foreclosure is more complex because
it accounts for the likelihood that some consumers who switch to Comcast would return to their previous MVPD
when the programming is restored (FCC, 2011 App B. ¶10).
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estimated from the DISH data, the Commission concluded that post-transaction Comcast would
“often” profit by engaging in permanent foreclosure of NBC broadcast stations and “almost
always” profit from a temporary foreclosure strategy (FCC, 2011 App. B ¶35).

B.

Raising Programming Prices to Rival MVPDs

The FCC’s second economic analysis used the Nash (1950) bargaining model to evaluate
the incentive of the joint venture to raise the price of NBCU programming to MVPDs that
compete with Comcast. In that framework, the transaction can be understood as raising the
opportunity cost of programming to the joint venture, as it raises the value to Comcast’s video
distribution service of denying a rival MVPD access to joint venture programming. The percustomer opportunity cost of programming to Comcast increases by the product (π x α x d):
Comcast’s per subscriber MVPD profit margin (π) times the probability that the customer would
switch to Comcast in the event that a rival MVPD loses access to the programming (α x d). The
latter probability equals the product of the diversion rate and departure rate that would be
employed in an assessment of the profitability of foreclosure;7 these rates would be expected to
vary by MVPD.
In the Nash bargaining model, an increase in the joint venture’s costs raises the
negotiated price with rival MVPDs by a fraction (1- μ) of the amount that costs rise, with the
fraction depending upon the relative patience or bargaining skill of the parties to the negotiation.
The Commission thus estimated the price increase using the expression:
ΔP = (1- μ) x (π x α x d).

7

This connection with the foreclosure profitability analysis arises because a bargaining party’s best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA) depends on its profits in the event of foreclosure.
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To implement this approach, the Commission relied on evidence from a recent academic study
(Yurukoglu, 2008) to conclude that the joint venture would have roughly equal bargaining skill
or patience as rival MVPDs when negotiating over cable programming (i.e., (1- μ) = ½). The
Commission also assumed that when Comcast was negotiating with MVPDs over carriage of the
NBC over-the-air broadcast network, the broadcast station had two-thirds of the bargaining skill.
In evaluating the consequences of the transaction for the price of broadcast programming,
the Commission employed the estimate of the per subscriber MVPD profit margin (π) and
diversion rate (α) that it used in evaluating the profitability of a withholding strategy. To
estimate the departure rate (d) for a broadcast station, the Commission used the value estimated
from the DISH retransmission dispute that was employed in the withholding analysis. No
similar empirical evidence was available from which to estimate the departure rate for individual
cable networks. Instead, the Commission inferred the departure rate for cable networks from
data on the affiliation fees that were negotiated with each MVPD. The method determined how
large the departure rate must have been to give pre-transaction NBCU or Comcast the bargaining
position necessary to obtain the observed affiliation fees that were negotiated in the past (FCC,
2011 App. B ¶42).
Applying this bargaining model analysis, the Commission calculated the likely increase
in retransmission consent fees for the NBC broadcast network in areas where a broadcast station
in the joint venture overlaps with Comcast’s cable footprint, and the likely increase in monthly
per-subscriber prices for the bundle of cable programming that NBCU contributed to the joint
venture. The Commission concluded that these prices would be expected to increase for all
Comcast’s MVPD rivals, with the largest increases for telephone company distributors of video
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programming in regions where Comcast is the dominant cable provider (FCC, 2011 App. B
¶47).

C.

Adverse Consequences of Vertical Integration in Other Transactions

Many economists interested in the competitive consequences of changes in market
structure view vertical mergers with less concern than horizontal mergers (ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, 2008 p. 439). In part for this reason, the FCC examined the effect on affiliate fees
of a past example of vertical integration between an MVPD and a content provider: the
integration of Fox programming with the DIRECTV direct broadcast satellite video distribution
system, subsequent to the 2004 transaction between News Corp. (the owner of the Fox broadcast
and cable networks) and Hughes (then the owner of DIRECTV, an MVPD). Application of the
Nash bargaining model, using data from the time of the News Corp./Hughes transaction, would
have predicted substantial post-integration price increases for the ten national networks,
including Fox, in which News Corp. then had a controlling interest.
To evaluate whether the earlier vertical integration episode led to price increases, as
would have been predicted through the application of the bargaining model, the FCC employed a
difference-in-differences regression model that looked at the change in affiliate fees that MVPDs
paid for the News Corp. networks before and after the transaction, and compared those changes
to the difference in fees that were paid for other national networks that did not become either
more or less vertically integrated during the same period (FCC, 2011 App. B ¶51).
The regression model was estimated on annual affiliate fee data from 2002 through 2009.
During five of these years, 2004 through 2009, News Corp. programming was integrated with
the DIRECTV distribution platform. The dependent variable was specified as the monthly per
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subscriber affiliate fee that was paid to the network or, alternatively, the percent change in
programming fees from the previous year. The key independent variable was the percentage of
the last five years during which News Corp. programming was integrated with DIRECTV. To
control for possible changes in programming quality, a three-year moving average of monthly
per subscriber programming expenses was included as an independent variable.8
The estimation results generally confirmed the price increase predictions that were
derived from application of the bargaining model (FCC, 2011 App. B ¶52). Average monthly
prices and the percentage price increase were both higher during periods of vertical integration,
and in each case the increase was statistically significant.

D.

Price Increases from Horizontal Aspects of the Transaction

Another empirical study conducted by the Commission evaluated a competitive concern
that could arise from the horizontal consolidation of Comcast programming and NBCU
programming within the joint venture. The Nash bargaining model predicts that if two networks
in the joint venture formerly controlled by separate firms are at least partial substitutes from the
standpoint of MVPDs, then the joint venture would be able to obtain a higher price for each.
Consolidation of programming in the hands of a single seller reduces the availability of substitute
programming to the buyer in the event that seller and buyer fail to reach an agreement,
effectively decreasing the “BATNA” (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) of any MVPD
negotiating with the joint venture and, in consequence, leading to a higher negotiated price.
More specifically, the Commission addressed the possibility that the consolidation of a
Comcast’s regional sports network (RSN) with a local affiliate of the NBC broadcast network
8

The regression models also included fixed effects for year and network, and variables accounting for the age of the
network. Standard errors were clustered by the owner of the programming.
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that served the same region would allow Comcast to negotiate a higher affiliate fee for the RSN
with other MVPDs.
To test this possibility, the Commission examined the effect of consolidation between a
Fox broadcast station and a Fox RSN within the same local market on RSN affiliate fees. The
difference-in-differences regression study was set up similarly to the model that was employed to
analyze the consequences of vertical integration between News Corp. and DIRECTV and
employed similar data.9 The results generally supported the conclusion that joint ownership of a
RSN and a local broadcast network leads to a higher affiliate fee that can be charged for the RSN
(FCC, 2011 App. B ¶55). Affiliate fees and the annual percentage increase in programming
prices were both higher when the RSN and local broadcast station were jointly owned, though
only the percentage change estimate was statistically significant.

E.

Discrimination in Program Carriage and Placement

A vertically-integrated firm like Comcast, which owns both video programming and
video distribution assets, has competing incentives when it considers whether its distribution
system should carry programming that competes with its own affiliated networks or providers.
On the one hand, it has an incentive to carry programming that is attractive to viewers, in order
to build and keep subscribers to its distribution system; also, carriage of its own networks can
avoid double-marginalization problems (provided that the integrated organization does its
internal transfer pricing sensibly). On the other hand, it has an incentive to deny carriage to
unaffiliated networks that compete with its networks, or only provide carriage on discriminatory

9

One difference is that standard errors were clustered by network, not by owner of the programming. The sample
used in the RSN analysis had only a small number of owner clusters, and RSNs were generally not sold in bundles.
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term and conditions, in order to boost its own affiliated networks in competition with those
programming rivals.
Comcast claimed that it did not discriminate in the past for anticompetitive reasons and
that its incentive to maximize downstream viewership would continue to dominate
anticompetitive incentives to discriminate after the transaction. Comcast also argued that
vertical integration would permit it to achieve efficiencies, including the elimination of double
marginalization. This claim suggested the possibility that Comcast might favor NBCU
programming after the transaction in order to achieve efficiencies rather than harm competition
in programming.
To bring quantitative evidence to bear on these issues, the Commission examined
whether Comcast had favored its own programming prior to the transaction, and if it did,
whether the motive was to harm competition or obtain efficiencies. These alternatives were
distinguished on the view that an MVPD has the most incentive to act anticompetitively in
making program carriage decisions in settings where it faces the least competition from rival
MVPDs (Goolsbee 2007).10 The Commission implemented this idea empirically by studying the
carriage decisions that pre-transaction Comcast made for the four national networks (Style, G4,
Versus, and Golf) in which it had a controlling interest that were carried on some but not all
cable systems, and thus for which carriage decisions could have a strategic component. The
Commission’s analysis employed data indicating the channel lineup at each cable system
headend for every MVPD in the country.
Using these data, the Commission estimated a logit regression to determine the
probability that a headend carried a Comcast network as a function of various control variables
10

More generally, a firm that is able to exercise market power has the greatest incentive and ability to do so in
markets in which its demand is least elastic. Greater rivalry would be expected to increase the elasticity of
Comcast’s firm-specific demand.
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that included an indicator variable for whether the headend belonged to Comcast, and a variable
constructed by interacting this indicator variable with the aggregate share of the local market that
subscribed to MVPD services owned by rival MVPDs (satellite providers and telephone
companies) (FCC, 2011 App. B ¶69). The share of rival providers was treated as exogenous,
unaffected by Comcast’s decision whether to carry the four networks studied. Other control
variables included measures of local market size, headend channel capacity, and local
demographics.
In the estimated equation, the indicator variable for whether the headend belonged to
Comcast was positive and significant, and the interaction variable with rival share was negative
and significant, in all specifications (FCC, 2011 App. B ¶70). These empirical results indicate
that Comcast favored affiliated programming more when making channel carriage decisions as
the video distribution rivalry it faced decreased. The results thus supported the conclusion that
Comcast favored affiliated programming over unaffiliated programming, and did so for
anticompetitive reasons.
The Commission performed a similar analysis to examine whether Comcast favored
affiliated programming in channel placement. The setup was similar, with the dependent
variable indicating whether each Comcast network was carried on the more desirable analog tier
of the MVPD system (channel number below 100). Again, the indicator variable for Comcast
was positive and significant, and the variable that reflected the interaction between the indicator
and rival share was negative and significant, which suggested that Comcast had favored its
affiliated channels in channel placement in the past for anticompetitive reasons (FCC, 2011 App.
B ¶70). This evidence did not address whether Comcast discriminated in the past against any
particular unaffiliated network in any specific instance, however.
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Conclusion
The commercialization of the Internet dates from the mid-1990s (Greenstein, 2001). Less
than two decades later, the FCC acted to protect continued competition in still-developing online
markets in two matters: the FCC’s Open Internet rulemaking and its order conditionally
approving the Comcast/NBCU joint venture.
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